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BOOK REVIEW
A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory
by Russell Hittinger
(Notre Dame. IN.: Unive rsity of Notre Dame Press. 1987. $24.95.)
In this book, Hittinger seeks to provide a critique of the "new natural law theory"
developed over the past two decades by Germain G. Grisez and, to a lesser degree , by John
M. Finnis . Grisez's articulation of the position began in the early 1960s with the
publication of his Contraception and the Na tural Law, continued with the publication of
major articles and massive books concerned with abortion , euthanasia and other issues ,
and , while still developing toda y, culminated in the 1983 publication of his Christian
Moral PrinCiples. the first of a projected four-volume work in moral theology. In Christian
Moral Principles. Grisez not only summari zed his theory of natural law, but also showed
how the natural law is brought to completion by the redeeming act of Jesus Christ. Finnis
has presented the position in two major works, Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980) and
Fundamentals of Ethics (1983) and in several major articles.
Hittinger's assessment of the work of Grisez and Finnis on natural law theory is, to put it
mildly, exceedingly negative. Hittinger claims that their work is fatally flawed in its
foundations because these authors have failed , in his judgment, to root their natural law
theory in philosophical anthropology and metaphysics. As a result , their natural law
theory is sad ly lacking and fails utterly to show why and how nature is normative. In fact ,
he regard s their effort as more Kantian than Thomistic because of the autonomy from
metaphysics and philosophical anthropology that they accord moral theory. He believes
that their position is , in essence, a quest for individualistic self-fulfillment which fails to
recognize the intrinsic value of huma n persons and the demands of the common good. He
likewise claims that their theory offers a woefully inadequate account of religion and that,
in Grisez's hands at any rate, it ultimately collapses into an irrational form of fideism.
These are serious charges. If what Hittinger has to say is true, his work constitutes a
devasting dismantling of the Grisez-Finnis "project," one that its authors would be well
advised to abandon immediately and start afresh . But note the "if": Hi/what Hittinger has
to say is true." But that is the central question: are Hittinger's criticisms true? Are they on
target? My judgment is that they are not. Rather, they are directed against a grotesque
caricature of the natural law position carefully developed by Grisez and Finnis, not against
the genuine article.
Fully to substantiate my judgment that Hittinger's critique is based on a terrible
misrepresentation and misunderstanding of what Grisez and Finnis are doing would
require a lengthy essay, not a relatively brief book review. But I have the obligation to offer
some support for my judgment. I shall do so by illustrating some of the very serious
shortcomings in Hittinger's analysis, noting first of all the very inaccurate way in which
Hittinger speaks of the "basic goods" identified by Grisez and Finnis and central to their
theory. Next I shall co mment on his claim that their account of the first principles of the
natural law, far from being rooted in the tradition of St. Thomas, is Kantian and fails to
show the basic human goods and our knowledge of primary natural law precepts must be
grounded in metaphysical and anthropological theory. Finally, I shall consider hi s claim
that their position is basically an individualistic quest for self-fulfillment that ignores the
intrinsic and irreplaceable va lue of human persons and neglects to take into account the
requirements of the common good.
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Hittinger correctly observes that Grisez has emp loyed more than one term to refer to
basic human goods, calling them "possibilities," "p urp oses," "values." a nd "ideals" as well
as "goods" (cf. H , p. 40). But Hittinger (ibid.) also asserts that Grisez calls these basic goods
"inclinations" and "tendencies," and elsewhere (H, p. 55) he writes as follows: ". . all th e
goods are defined as actio ns which are attractive to the agent" (emphasis added). But Grisez
never refers to the basic goods of human persons as " inclinations" or "tendencies." Rather,
with St. Thomas (cf. Summa Theologiae, 1-2, q. 94, a. 2) he refers to the basic or natural inclinations or tendencies within human perso ns, orienting them to the goods perfective of them.
T he goods, as Grisez sees it (again along with St. Thomas) are "ends", not inclinat ions. Nor
does Grisez eve r define the goods as "actions attractive to the agent". The subjectivism that
Hittinger attributes to Grisez by speak in g in t his way is utterly without foundation in
a nyt hin g that Grisez has written a nd is totall y at varian ce with his ent ire wo rk.
A central c harge levelled by Hittinger agai nst Grisez and F innis is that their account of
the natural law is more Kantian than Thomistic insofar as it posit s a non-rational intuition
of th e prim ary precepts of the nat ura l law and does not show how nature is "norma ti ve."
that is . how natural law precepts a re grounded in philosophical anthropology and
metaph ys ics. This c harge is simp ly fa lse. In their treatment of the first prece pts of the
natural law. G risez and Finnis ex plicitl y base th eir work on the thought ofSt. Thomas. The
Commo n Doctor in sisted th at the/irst principles of practical reason or of the natural law.
like the first principles of speculative inquiry, are com pletely underivedfrom anyt hin g prior
to them; otherwise they would not be " first" or "primary." Aquinas's point - and the point
which Grisez a nd Finnis make too - is that there are propositions of practical reason ,
rooted in the concept of the "goo d," which are self-ev ident ly true or per se nota. Among
these a re the propositions that "good is to be done and pursued and its opposite (evi l) is to
be avoided ," a nd , as Aquinas himself wr ites, (Summa Theologiae, 1-2, q. 94, a. 2), "all those
things that reaso n na turally a pprehend s as good ," i.e., a ll those goods to which we are
naturally inclined, are goods to be pursued and done and their oppos ites are evi ls to be
avoided.
Nor does this mean that Grise z and Finnis are inso uci an t or unaware of the relationship
between a so und meta physics a nd anthropology a nd a so und moral theory. These go
together; but we do not derive our knowledge of the natural law by deducing it from our
knowledge of human nature; persons who may well have a very erroneous understanding of
human na ture (e.g. , a behavioris t) might well know what they are req uired to do by the
mora l law . Moreover, both Grisez and Finnis insist that were our nature oth er than it is,
then the goods perfective of us and orie ntin g us dynamically toward them would be
different than they act ually a re. Moreover, both aut hors, an d part icularly Gr isez, have
written at length to criticize the fa lse du a lism of modern philosophy and theology which
denigrates the good of human bodily life. Grisez, moreover, has writt en at length in
criticism of modern determinist philosophies and has amply defended suc h anthropo logical
truths as the freedom of self-determination.
In Hittin ger's account, (cf. H, pp. 53 ff) , the Grisez-Finnis theory emphasizes o ne's own
self-fulfillment and the avoidance of unn ecessary se lf limitation. He says (p. 87) that their
theory "seems to limit the motivation a l life of practica l reason merely to a concern. or
respect, for modes of one's own well-being and fulfillment." This claim is a serious injustice
to Grisez and Finnis and simp ly ignores what they actua lly say. Within sentences of one
passage that Hittinger cites ou t of the context to sup port his claim, Grisez, for instance, had
this to say: "T he idea l of integral human fulfillment is that of a single system in which all the
goods of human persons would contribute to the fulfillment of the who le community of
persons." A nd shortl y la ter. in the same sect ion of hi s wri tin gs from which Hittinger cites a
passage to prove Grisez's individ ualism, Grisez writes: " Integra l human fulfillment is not
individualistic sati sfaction of desires; it is the realization of a ll the human goods in the
whole hu man community" (cf. Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, p. 186).
I could co ntinue to note simi lar misrepresentations of the Grisez-Finnis theory found in
Hittinger's book. But I think th at I have a lread y show n sufficiently how wide o ff the mark
a re Hittinger's claims. The theory he attacks is simply one of his own making. I have been
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studying Grisez and Finnis for years (along with a st ud y of St. Thoma s) . I picked up
Hittinger's book. hoping to find in it so me constructive criti cism. or at least a pointing out
of a reas that a re not clear a nd need development in the work of Grise z a nd Finnis. But as I
rea d the book. I cou ld not believe my eyes . because th e "Grisez-Finnis theory" I found in it
was utt erly unrecognizable to one who had spent man y years studying it. I knew somethi ng
was wrong . A close in spection of the work and comparison of some key passages with
passages in Grisez a nd Finnis showed how poorly Hittinger had don e hi s work. It is sad to
re nd er such a ve rdict. but it is the on ly one I can honestly give .
-

William E. May
Professor of Moral Theology
The Catholic University of America
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